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RESTRICTED 
THE NEAR EAST 
A lecture delivered by 
Professor Hans Kohn 
at the Naval War College 
November 5, 1948 
As y�u know from my lecture on Russia, I am convinced 
that we cannot approach any problem today except by seeing it in 
its historical perspective. It was exactly one hundred fifty years 
.ago that the Near or Middle Eastern question was opened up for 
Western Europe. For we may say that before 1798 the Near and 
Middle East entered the attention of Europe or the Western world 
little, if at all. The Mediterranean, the Middle East, which had 
been the center of world politics and the center of world civiliza­
tion until about 1450 of our era, disappeared entirely from our 
sight after that. It may be said that Columbus went to discover 
America, (which as you know he never intended to do) because 
of the very fact that the Mediterranean had been closed, the Near 
East had been obliterated, and with the Near East the two great 
Asiatic trade. routes, the two trade routes from Europe to the 
Far East, one -leading through Alexandria and the Red Sea, the 
second through Antioch and the Persian Gulf. These two trade 
routes, from antiquity until 1400 had been the most important 
eommercial routes of history, those on which depended the import­
.ance of Italy. Both in antiquity and in the middle ages, the vital­
ity and leadership of Italy, of Rome and later of Venice and Gen­
oa, arid the phenomenon of the Renaissance would have been im­
possible without Italy's geographic strategic position in relation 
to these two trade routes. In the 15th century the victory of the 
Turks closed these· trade · routes to Western mankind. With that 
Professor Kohn is Professor of History at Smith College. His 
lecture on "Russia" appeared in a previous issue of the "Information 
Service." 
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moment began the decay of Italy, the decay of the Mediterranean 
and the rise of the Atlantic powers. 
It was one hundred fifty years ago that the strategic genius 
of Napoleon reopened the Middle East and discovered what is in 
my mind the most important fact in the world situation today, 
namely : that the Middle East is the strategic hub of the Old 
World. Whoever controls the Middle East undoubtedly controls 
the Old World. General Bonaparte who, as you all know, was a 
Mediterranean, born in Corsica, was keenly aware of it. He was 
never a Frenchman by geographic loyalty; his only real loyalty 
belonged to the Mediterranean. He dreamt, as in our own time 
his small imitator Mussolini did, of the resurrection of the Mediter­
ranean empire, not anymore for its own sake but as a key for the 
control of the world. In 1798, Bonaparte had the immensely daring 
conception, a conception similar to that of Alexander the Great, 
to land an expeditionary force in Egypt and to push on from Egypt 
through Syria, Iraq and Iran into India. He was fascinated by 
the idea which, since then, all world conquerors have had, whether 
it was Hitler, Mussolini or Stalin, to destroy the British Empire 
as the only bulwark standing between, on the one hand, the aspira­
tion to world domination, and on the other hand, the world of 
liberty. He wished to deal the British Empire a deadly blow by 
going across the ancient land route to India. You know he pushed on 
from Egypt to Palestine and Haifa, as we call it today, and it was 
only because of the pestilence in camp and because of certain news 
coming from France that he had to call off his venture and return 
to France. From this moment two things remained. . One is what 
I would call "the regeneration of Islam." Napoleon's administration 
in Egypt, though very short-lived, left deep traces. There was a 
man of energy, ruthlessness, strength. His name was Mohamed 
Ali, a simple soldier in the Turkish Army, an Albanian by birth. 
By his intelligence, and by his unscrupulous .ruthlessness he made 
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himself governor or pasha of Egypt, then a Turkish province. As 
pasha he learned enough fr<?m French influence to wish to modernize
Egypt, to create a modern army, even to begin a modern navy, to 
introduce modern economy. Islam was awakened from hundreds 
of years of lethargy, apathy and sleep. The present king of Egypt, 
Farouk is a descendant of the Mohamed Ali whom I have just 
mentioned. 
But the second, and more important consideration for us is 
that Napoleon drew attention to the long forgotten trade routes 
and the strategic position of the Middle East and drew the at­
tention of the British there, and from that moment on it has been 
British policy to make sure that the Middle East does not fall 
into the hands of any great military power and that the Middle 
East will be kept open. From 1798 until today, all British foreign 
policy and all British strategy has been dominated by the one con­
viction not to allow any great military power to establish itself in 
the Middle East. Today we have inherited the British task both 
politically and strategically. It is, in my opinion, our foremost 
consideration not to allow any great military power to claim ex­
clusive control of the Middle East, because whoever holds. the Mid­
dle East, holds Africa,.Asia and Europe. This has been shown very 
clearly in the two wars which have been fought, since Napoleon, 
for world control. 
The two wars fought for world control, World War I, and 
World War II, both had one of the decisive battlefields in the Near 
c.: East. It was much less noticed in the United States, yet in World 
War I the Germans made a very determined effort, with the 
help of the Turks, to capture the Suez Canal and to drive the 
British out of the Middle East. At that time the attempt was 
made from the east, with the help of Turkey, to the Suez Canal. 
The British defeated the attempt and, in a counter-attack, oc­
cupied Jerusalem and later drove up to Syria. There is one im-
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portant point in this struggle in World War I against Germany 
and Turkey: the British tried to enlist the cooperation of the Arabs. 
The Turks were then the enemies of Britain and allied with Ger­
many. The only people who could be organized against the Turks 
were the Arabs. The Arabs were the first great force in Islam, 
the first great conquering race of the Mohammedan religion. They 
had been obscured and dominated by the Turks, and the British 
now tried to reawaken their national pride, the memory of the 
centuries of Arab greatness. They were quite successfully sup­
ported in that indirectly by Americans since the most important 
educational institutions in the Arab world were the American insti­
tutions, especially the American University of Beirut in Lebanon, 
the greatest educational institution in the Near East. The Ameri­
can missionaries there tried to arouse an Arab awakening which 
had no connection with that provoked by the British. The Ameri­
can one had been more on the intellectual side, educational ; the 
British one more on the· military, political side. The British ap­
pealed above all to the Arab ruler, to the Arab sheik in Mecca, in 
the capital of Islam, in the foremost city of Mohammedan 
tradition, where a descendant of Mohammed himself, by the name 
of Hussein Ibn Ali was then the leading member of the aristocracy, 
or as the Arabs called it, the Sharif of Mecca. His son is Ab­
dullah, King of Trans-Jordan at present, and from that fact we 
can understand both the long lasting British ties with Ab­
dullah of Trans-Jordan and Abdullah's ambition to play .a great 
role in the Arabic or Mohammedan world-for Abdullah is the 
only surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. It was a romantic Eng­
lishman, one of the strange figures with which the otherwise gen­
erally "dull" British stock is quite rich, this rather strange exotic 
figure, T. E. Lawrence, who went out to Arabia and started what 
he descri.bed as the "revolt in the desert."• The British suc­
ceeded, with the help of·the Arabs in defeating the Turks and the 
German attempt to dominate the Middle East. 
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In World War II the Middle East was again a decisive 
battlefield. You gentlemen will remember as much as I do the 
fateful month of June 1940 when the German armies had 
triumphed all over Europe; when Hitler and Stalin were close 
friends and allies, when France lay crushed and when Italy had 
joined the war on the side of Germany to be in for the kill of 
the French and British empires; when Marshal Petain, certain­
ly a soldier of some knowledge, expected that within three weeks 
- Britain would fall. At that moment the question was for me, who
knew the Middle East very well, not what would happen in the
British Isles but what would happen in the Middle East, because
if the Hitler-Mussolini combination had taken. hold of the Middle
East, . then there was no doubt with me that Asia. was lost to Hit-.
ler and the Japanese. Lost, I am entirely convinced, irrevoc;ably for
any foreseeable future. At that moment Mussolini entered the war,
and at that time we did not know, though some of us suspected,
u that the famous Fascist army, navy, and air force did not exist
really. We all were impressed by Mussolini. You remember his
picture in the papers then, with open mouth, his jaw forward, de­
claring that "In the next war, Italian bayonets will decide the
war and Italian airplanes will blacken the skies." It was in 1938
that he declared that to the Italian senate. You may remember
that the air force impressed us when Balbo flew over with his
fliers to Chicago, so much so that I think even today an' avenue
in Chicago is called A venue Balbo. In any case, it impressed us
tremendously. And now in June 1940 the British had 30,000
men along the Suez canal with about 500 second rate planes. The
30,000 men were mostly imperial colonial troops, Australians, with
some Negroes from Africa, and others. Mussolini had 150,000
men of the best soldiers in Eritrea and the same number under
the Duke of Aosta in Ethiopia. I was afraid then that the su­
perior Italian air force and the two armies; could move in a pin-
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cer movement on Egypt and the Suez canal, liquidate thE:! British 
situation there, and establish an impregnable situation for the 
Axis from Morrocco to China. If that had happened, our land­
ing in Africa would not have succeeded. 
It was because of the unique luck and the courage of the 
British that the Italians, and later Rommel, were defeated. I am en­
tirely convinced that, should a next war come, and I have good 
reasons to believe that it will not come if the West be­
comes really united and prepared, that the decisive spot will 
again be the Middle East. That is the reason why we must make 
sure, and are making sure I think successfully, that the Middle 
East does not fall into Russian hands. The Russians have tried 
to gain control of the Middle East since the days of Catherine 
the II, who conquered the Crimea, the North Shore of the Black 
Sea. Catherine hated her son, the future Czar Paul, but loved 
her grandchildren. She selected their names, not Paul, and she 
named her oldest grandchild Alexander, in memory of Alexander 
the Great who conquered Asia, and named her second son Con­
stantine in memory of Constantine the First, who established Con­
stantinople, Byzantium, as the seat of the world empire. From 
the days of Catherine II to the days of Stalin, the Middle East has 
been the prime ambition of the Russians. The British never tried 
to occupy or rule the Middle East. Primarily they wished to ex­
clude Russia and Napoleon and the Germans. Our policy is the 
same. We are int�rested in excluding Russia, and so far we have 
done well. I can assure you from a close knowledge of the Middle 
East, where I lived for eight years, and from a study of the 
situation in the Middle East, that we have succeeded beyond any­
body's expectations, with relatively small cost so far, in averting 
an imminent threat to the Middle East which two years ago seemed 
unavertable. 
If we could achieve in China what we have done in the 
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Middle East, I think we could begin to feel much more secure 
than we do now. 
Two years ago Greece was threatened from Albania, Yugo­
slavia and Bulgaria. Greece is important for us because the Greeks 
are the only sea-faring people in the Near and Middle East. Neither 
the Russians nor the Turks nor the Arabs nor the Persians are a 
sea-faring people. The Greeks are, by their history and by the_ir 
whole geography. Their islands are strategic islands and Greece 
is destined to be the key to further Russian penetration. East of 
Greece is Turkey and two years ago the Russians put forward 
strong demands for a large part of Eastern Anatolia. There is a 
claim, which is not unfounded, that centuries ago Armenians lived 
there. But you can't turn the wheel of history back centuries, 
though many nationalists are trying it. Three Soviet professors 
proved to their own satisfaction: and that of 'Mr. Stalin that 
northern Turkey, on the shore of the Black Sea, had once been 
Georgian territory that should be annexed to Soviet Georgia. 
Turkey would thus lose all Kurdistan, these commanding heights 
from which the road to the Persian Gulf lies open. Secondly the 
Russians claimed then the right to put their bases into the Dar­
danelles, which would have practically meant domination of 
Istanbul or Constantinople and of Turkey. The third important 
thing is that, two years ago a Soviet puppet government, backed 
by Soviet troops, was established in Iran, in Azerbaijan. This 
government was a threat to Turkey and to the Persian Gulf. That 
was the situation two years ago, and everybody was convinced that 
if Russian armed columns break through to the Persian Gulf, that 
means to our oil fields there, nothing could stop them. 
Now two years have gone by. There is no actual threat 
whatsoever at present to Greece or Turkey or to Iran. The Soviet 
government in Azerbaijan has been liquidated. All Russian troops 
are out of Iran. No new demands for Turkish territory are voiced 
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although the situation in Greece is rotten and will remain rotten, 
for the very simple reason that the Greek nation has never yet 
learned to work together without being at the brink of a civil 
war. In spite of that, no Russian or Yugoslav or Bulgarian soldier 
has transgressed into Greece; on the other hand the front of Stalin 
on the frontiers of Greece has been broken. Yugoslavia is to­
day no longer an entirely dependable satellite of Russia, an aston­
ishing change. Two years ago Greece was Russia's; today Stalin 
cannot be very certain of Tito's Yugoslavia. So I would say that, 
so far as I can see, the situation in the Middle East, with rather 
little expenditure, has been immensely strengthened. 
That is important, not only for strategic reasons, but also 
for the oil. You all know about the British oil which exists in 
southwestern Persia. The concession in northern Iraq is one half 
British, one fourth American and one fourth French. By far the 
most important concession of all, those in Saudi Arabia, are en­
tirely American. This oil is needed for three purposes. One is 
for the economic recovery of Europe under the Marshall plan. We 
can't send oil from the U. S. The Europeans have no oil; theirs 
comes from the Middle East. The Russians don't wish Europe to 
recover. They would like to cut up the Middle Eastern oil. Second, 
the British navy depends upon the Middle Eastern oil and the Brit­
ish navy is as much our interest as our navy is. And third, even 
our navy depends on Middle Eastern oil. 
Now some people here in the United States tell you "Why 
should we worry about the profits of the Standard Oil Com­
pany?" I must tell you that they are right. We should not worry 
about the profits of the Standard Oil Company. But the whole 
question thus put, is pure demagogy. We need the oil from the 
Middle East, irrespective of any profit or not, for our strategic 
survival. If people come and tell you that the State Department 
is following a certain policy in the Middle East because it is 
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subservient to the oil interests, that is the barest nonsense! We 
must hold the Middle East for our survival-strategically, and be­
cause we·need the oil, not for the profits for the Standard Oil Com­
pany. Our vital national interests are involved there. 
That is one point, and the second point is that we cannot 
hold these regions without close cooperation with the native peoples. 
That is what the British learned. The British did not know it fifty 
years ago; the British . learned that they cannot rely on India or 
Pakistan, on Arabia or Turkey, without the sympathy and coopera­
tion of the native populations; These native populations, the Turk, 
Arab, Iranian or Persian, are today in a state of national awaken­
ing, of the awakening of political consciousness, in a feeling of im­
mense pride which can be very easily hurt. They are not like the 
British or-ourselves, so secure that they would riot mind pin-pricks 
or anything like that. They are immensely jealous of their national 
position. And I am entirely convinced that we cannot hold these 
regions without the sympathy of the native populations on our side. 
The British enlisted the sympathy of the Arabs in World War II, 
especially of the two most important · Arab rulers. One was Ibn 
Saud, the king of Saudi Arabia, a very strong personality, a man 
of unusual power as you probably know. King Ibn Saud is a man 
of about sbtty-eight just now. King Ibn Saud began his life as a 
small sheikh. He was a small potentate leading fanatical Mo­
hammedans called the Wahhabis. It was through their fanaticism 
and his genius of leadership that he conquered the whole of 
Arabia. For the first time sin�e Mohammed, he .united the whole 
of Arabia and brought peace and order there. Ibn Saud is un­
doubtedly a person of unusual strength, a commanding personal­
ity, who created in the desert, in the immense poverty of the nomad­
ic tribes what was, for the first time, a progressive orderly govern­
ment. The second man is King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, the only 
29 
9
Kohn: The Near East
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. The British understood that 
they had to enlist the friendship of these two . men, and it was 
due to their friendship that in World War II, in the most tragic 
situation in the Middle East, the Arabs did not cut the British com­
munications. Though the Arab could have never waged open war, 
they could have been very damaging if they wanted to, but they 
stood loyally with Britain. Britain cannot forget that. Britain 
knows that her security and by her security, our security, depends 
on establishing friendship with the Arabs and with the Turks. 
And now in the last few words I wish to talk about the 
Turks because there is nothing more astonishirtg and nothing more 
indicative of the future of the Middle East than the transforma­
tion of Turkey. Some of you may have been to Turkey before 
World War I. Some American ships sailing there remember the 
entirely oriental, backward, medieval country then ruled by a Sul­
tan, a ruler who was at the same time the spiritual head of the 
state. Turkey was entirely ruled by Mohammedan medieval law. 
The women had, to go veiled; polygamy existed ; there was no 
modern social life whatsoever. After World War I, Turkey under 
a great military leader Mustafa Kemal (or as he was called later 
Kemal Ataturk) drove out the invading Greeks, and for the first 
time in one hundred fifty years Turkey became entirely )nde­
pendent from the . intrigues and controls . of foreign powers. Mus­
tafa Kemal now began what I regard as the most successful pro-, 
cess of modernization done anywhere in Asia. Much more suc­
cessful than not only the other Asiatic peoples but also than 
the Communists, because Mustafa Kemal did it without any super­
ffous cruelty, without barbarizing the land. He tried to establish 
there something like a modern European nation and he has suc­
ceeded to an astonishing degree; Greece today is torn by internal 
dissension, Greece is not a nation. Persia is a backward country, 
certainly not a nation, and the Russians could cut through Persia 
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like a knife cuts through butter. Turkey is different; Turkey is an 
organic, integrated nation since Mustafa Kemal. It would be a 
tremendous task for the Russians to conquer Turkey, and they 
know it very well. The "secularization" of Turkey took her away 
from her ancient Mohammedan medieval order to be modernized 
and to be equipped as a modern nation. Think only of the position 
of the women; there is no polygamy in Turkey anymore. In 
Turkey today modern European law absolutely prevails. Women 
are no longer veiled; women can participate fully in all social and 
political life, a tremendous change in a few years time. I am 
convinced that in that direction all the Middle Eastern people will 
go. It will take much longer with the Arabs, or with the Persians. 
The Arabs are today disunited; still not a modern nation like the 
Turks but they are on the way to it and it is· immensely im­
portant, as the British have understood, to help this develop­
ment forward instead of trying to hinder it. 
I am optimistic about the Middle East. Our position in the 
Middle East, or the British one, which is for all practical pur­
poses one and the same, is strategically sound and can be and 
will be, in my opinion, politically sound, because we need the Mid­
dle East and ultimately the Middle East needs us, needs us not 
only for protection against Russia. The Middle East cannot en­
ter by its own strength upon a sound policy of economic and 
social modernization-only American and British capital and 
American and British educational and technical help can provide 
the means. One hundred fifty years ago the Middle East was 
opened up. Since then it has formed a bridge between Europe, 
Asia and Africa. I'm convinced it is a strong bridge, one which 
can easily become a very important factor in the defense system of 
Western civilization and world peace. 
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